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**PRESENTATION BY MR. DAVID BEALL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE  
INTER-AMERICAN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL COMMISSION (CICAD)**

(Presented to the Fourth Plenary Session held on January 30, 2004)

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It is appropriate that an organization such as CICAD should be part of a meeting of the Committee Against Terrorism. I thank you for the invitation.

My understanding is that the session has 2 principal goals:

- A. The first is the adoption of effective hemispheric strategies for the prevention, detection and eradication of terrorism. To that I would add “reaction”: The things that countries do alone and together in reaction to acts of terrorism. The word reaction is not as welcome or as comforting as the word prevention, but it is as critical.
- B. The second principal goal here is inter-agency cooperation.

I am not sure I can distinguish between the 2 in terms of importance, but each is very different, and each must be present, must be real. That is, each must be seen to function. I need hardly say that the concern that exists throughout the hemisphere regarding governability and one of its key components, the proper role of the state, goes to the heart of anti-terrorism. The first requirement of a sovereign state is life. It is the protection of citizens from catastrophic attack. Any nation whose population does not have basic assurances regarding protection from the anarchy of terror quickly finds itself disintegrating economically and as a community unit.

For the strategy response, CICTE and CICAD have been developing an initiative that speaks to the readiness and capacity of national agencies to be effective on 2 cardinal points of cooperative strategy—prevention and reaction.

However, I would prefer to begin with the second goal, interagency cooperation—meaning within the OAS. Here I am speaking of working within established priorities across areas. My example is money laundering. It is a concern—a principal one—for CICAD as an anti-drug necessity. But it also has the same direct concern for CICTE. In addition, the typologies used by terrorists are frequently exactly the same as are used by traffickers. And I would add that the link between traffickers and terrorists will likely be the same as has developed between drugs and arms. Where one is found, there too will be found the other.

In thinking of this need for efficient work between areas of the OAS, we need to hold the idea of complementary and not duplication. The fact that one easily displaces the other can be found in the conclusions of the consultancy of Deloitte Touche, which were presented to the Permanent Council in November. But neither the problems we face nor the resources we have will permit such a strategy—duplication is not an answer.

Therefore CICTE and CICAD began our immediate and operational cooperation with anti-money laundering. This is a training series aimed at national Financial Intelligence Units. The Units are responsible for national analysis and case development of all types of money laundering. To make the training complete, we have added a module that deals specifically with terrorism aspects and can be taught as a part of the complete package, or be given separately. CICTE for its part will organize courses for trainers to use other components of the course material.

All of this work has a 3<sup>rd</sup> partner—the Inter-American Development Bank. The training is being given to national FIU staff in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. We believe that this kind of problem—one in which criminals use the same techniques for different or even combined purposes—in fact requires this kind of pro-active cooperation. This example is operational.

My second theme is strategic. This possibility responds more to the most basic role of the state—the protection of the life of the people, and I put it in these terms because terrorism calculates its effect on governability through attacks on the people. Terrorism attacks the public, but it aims to destroy the structure of government and the very foundation of civil society.

CICAD and CICTE have therefore considered an Inter-American Crisis Response Network, an information-action net that would, throughout the hemisphere, provide fast (very fast) communications for use by national authorities in a developing emergency or in response to an attack by terrorists.

The reason for this is clear. Reaction must be fast to be effective. Whether in prevention or in response, minutes will make the difference.

The operating agencies are, in one form or another, all in place. Not much money would be required to provide real-time, 24-hour links. And there is nothing that would be more operationally cost effective. Member states do not know well the place or the time of a terrorism attack, but what they do know or what can be inferred must be utilized to the maximum.

Such a network is easily possible from the point of view of the technician. It is the national decision level and the responsible agency operations that would require change, but the change is not measured in money. Rather, it is a change in mental habit and a change in operational procedures that is required to make it work. The financial support would not be substantial. Once, again, to work, the system—via a training and testing period—would have to have the confidence, the operating confidence, that a terrorism problem, anywhere, would get an instant and informed response from any other country in the hemisphere at any hour, on any day of the year.

In fact the effort here is not one of cost. It is one of attention.

And this strategic concept of an interconnected emergency response network could also serve (in a logic similar to that of the money laundering example) for natural disaster responses, many of whose characteristics are similar to those involved with terrorism. It is another example of cooperation by complementarity.